יום ראשון, 13 ביולי 2025

[Ribonut-nashimbyarok-WIG] הסיכויים וסיכונים בתוכנית האמירטים Opportunities &Risks in the Emirate Plan

בס"ד

 

תחיית החמולות: הסיכויים והסיכונים שבתוכנית האמירויות

 

English follows Hebrew

 

היוזמה מבטיחה הכרה במדינת ישראל כמדינת העם היהודי, וכן ויתור על השאיפה להקמת מדינה פלסטינית. אך ראוי לעמוד על הסיכונים והתועלות המקופלים במעמד שלטוני כזה עבור ישראל


מאמרה של גיטה חזני-מלכיאור, סגנית נשיא מכון הרצל וחברה בפורום הריבונות.

 

המאמר התפרסם לראשונה בעיתון מקור ראשון. לקריאת המאמר: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinions/article/181019

 

תרגמנו את המאמר גם לאנגלית. ראו בהמשך המייל

 

תנועת הריבונות

ליצירת קשר: https://linktr.ee/ribonut.il

 

The Resurgence of Clans: The Opportunities and Risks in the Emirate Plan for Judea and Samaria

The initiative promises recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, as well as relinquishment of the aspiration to establish a Palestinian state. But it is worth examining the risks and benefits embedded in such a governing structure for Israel.

By Gita Hazani-Melchior, Vice President of the Herzl Institute and member of the Sovereignty Forum.

First published  in Hebrew in Makor Rishon on July 11th, 2025. Transslated into English by the Sovereignty Movement. Link to the original article in Hebrew: https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinions/article/181019


Dr. Mordechai Kedar's initiative to establish local emirates in Judea and Samaria as an alternative to Palestinian Authority rule is both original and creative. Its value lies in distinguishing the advantages and disadvantages of the various governmental structures characteristic of the Arab world, and leveraging them as part of a formula to resolve the Arab–Jewish conflict. Kedar identified that the Gulf emirates, governed by a single clan, tend to prosper—whereas the backward Arab states are ruled by multi-tribal and multi-sectarian regimes that impose loyalty on their citizens.

The initiative promises recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, as well as a renunciation of the aspiration to establish a Palestinian state. However, it is important to examine the risks and benefits inherent in such a governing structure for Israel, the differences between the clans in Judea and Samaria and those in the Gulf emirates, and the possibility that these clans could rise up in a generation or two and demand national recognition—from a far stronger starting point than the Palestinian Authority had. After all, the Oslo Accords gave significant momentum to Palestinian nationalism.

Before the Oslo process, control among the Arabs of Judea and Samaria was in the hands of clan leaders who operated as independent power centers. With the launch of the agreements, the PLO—imposed from outside—established itself as the central authority and weakened the status of the traditional local leadership. On the other hand, it had to rely on the clan heads because of the public's loyalty to them, for the sake of governmental stability. Indeed, although the clan leaders were not central players in the Oslo process, they were recruited to help the Authority reduce opposition to its takeover and gain acceptance among the Arab public.

In conservative-nationalist political thought, the family, tribe, and clan are considered primary, natural social units in a nation's development. Because of the loyalty and tradition that characterize them, they hold substantial political authority and power on the path to achieving national goals.

However, there will be significant differences between clan-based emirates in Judea and Samaria and the Gulf emirates. In Judea and Samaria, the clans would hold a local status without sovereignty or international relations, whereas the Gulf emirates have independent, sovereign status, are members of the UN, and maintain embassies. In Judea and Samaria, leadership would be communal and decentralized among clans, while in the Gulf, governance is centralized with advanced state institutions. Here (in Judea and Samaria), there would be local sheikhs whose influence is limited to tribal matters, while in the Gulf emirates, there are dynastic super-leaders with centralized authority. Economic development here would be local and regional in scope, whereas in the Gulf, it is among the most advanced in the world.

Will the local characteristics of these proposed emirates easily cancel out the Palestinian narrative and its political achievements? That is uncertain. And there are additional reservations worth considering.

The first reservation concerns the term "emirate": it implies a politically independent territory ruled by a family dynasty. The anticipated inclusion of these local emirates in the Abraham Accords, which are international in nature, would undermine the local character of emirate governance. Their inclusion could draw inspiration from the Gulf emirates and foster national aspirations. While they might recognize a Jewish state, it would be one that is not sovereign over territories they would claim for themselves. It is essential to ensure in advance that the exclusive legal sovereign over the "political" territory of the emirates is Israel. Another safeguard would be to reconsider the use of the term "emirate" — perhaps replacing it with something like "Hebron Arab Council" — in order to preclude any potential interpretation of future national-state sovereignty.

The second reservation arises from a statement by Sheikh Ja'abari of Hebron, who said that the Palestinian Authority "does not represent the Palestinians." In other words, the local emirates would continue to represent the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, and the official identity of the clans would remain "Palestinian." Israel cannot afford to leave the term "Palestine" intact. Only by restoring the name "Arabs" to its former use can the political curse of Hadrian be erased, bringing blessing to the Middle East.

Finally, there is also the moral-historical challenge: the initiative to establish local emirates is embedded within the Abraham Accords with the Gulf states. If the descendants of Abraham are returning to the paradigm of traditional tribal-clan loyalty, then agreements named after our patriarch Abraham must act in loyalty to the legacy of the promise. Ishmael is not part of the promise to Israel; he received a separate promise.

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The Sovereignty Movement

To Contact us: https://linktr.ee/sovereignty.il

 

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